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Abstract—In-network data aggregation is an essential tech-
nique in mission critical wireless sensor networks (WSNs) for
achieving effective transmission and hence better power conserva-
tion. Common security protocols for aggregated WSNs are either
hop-by-hop or end-to-end, each of which has its own encryption
schemes considering different security primitives. End-to-end
encrypted data aggregation protocols introduce maximum data
secrecy with in-efficient data aggregation and more vulnerability
to active attacks, while hop-by-hop data aggregation protocols
introduce maximum data integrity with efficient data aggregation
and more vulnerability to passive attacks.
In this paper, we propose a secure aggregation protocol for
aggregated WSNs deployed in hostile environments in which
dual attack modes are present. Our proposed protocol is a
blend of flexible data aggregation as in hop-by-hop protocols
and optimal data confidentiality as in end-to-end protocols. Our
protocol introduces an efficient O(1) heuristic for checking data
integrity along with cost-effective heuristic-based divide and
conquer attestation process which is O(lnn) in average -O(n) in
the worst scenario- for further verification of aggregated results.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network is usually a collection of hun-
dreds or thousands of resource-constrained devices with small
memories, low bandwidth and limited power resources. They
are deployed in fields where persistent human monitoring and
surveillance are either impossible or infeasible. These small
detectors can be used to sense events ranging from simple
readings (e.g. sensing room temperature) to more important
and sensitive measures (e.g. intruder detection in military
applications, detecting wildfire or signs of any catastrophic
phenomena). Raw data collected using these limited sensors
are usually queried by a more powerful device called base
station (BS) -which may be far away from sensing fields- for
further analysis and event-based reactions [16].
Since wireless sensor networks are energy constrained and
bandwidth limited, reducing communications between sensors
and base stations has a significant effect on power conservation
and bandwidth utilization [7]. Aggregated sensor networks
serve this purpose by introducing designated nodes called
aggregators that provide efficient data collection and transmis-
sion. An aggregator can sense its own data while aggregating
received results from children nodes, which in turn may be
leaf sensors or aggregators as well.
Aggregated wireless sensor networks provide better power
conservation and efficient use of communication channels but
introduce additional security concerns. A passive adversary
may capture sensitive results of aggregated data that represents
a large partition of the aggregated WSN if the key of the root
aggregator of that partition is compromised. On the other hand,
an active adversary can forge aggregated data of a partition by
compromising the parent node of that partition. Many security
protocols for aggregated WSNs were introduced to solve these
security problems. These security protocols can be classified
according to their underlying encryption schemes into end-to-
end and hop-by-hop secure data aggregation protocols.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
previous work on secure aggregation on WSNs and we define
our problem. In Section III, we present our network model
and its design goals, along with attacker model. In Sections IV
and V, we demonstrate our security protocol and provide anal-
ysis of its complexity. The paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give a short background on previous work
of secure aggregation protocols in WSNs, which are classified
as end-to-end and hop-by-hop.
In end-to-end encryption schemes [1], [4], [10], [15], in-
termediate aggregators apply some aggregation functions on
encrypted data which they can’t decrypt. This is because these
intermediate aggregators don’t have access to the keys that
are only shared between data originators (usually leaf sensor
nodes) and the BS. In CDA [4] sensor nodes share a common
symmetric key with the BS that is kept hidden from middle-
way aggregators. In [1] each leaf sensor share a distinct long-
term key with the BS. This key is originally derived from the
master secret only known to the BS. These protocols show that
aggregation of end-to-end encrypted data is possible through
using additive Privacy Homomorphism (PH) as the underlying
encryption scheme. Although these protocols are supposed to
provide maximum data secrecy across the paths between leaf
sensor nodes and their sink, overall secrecy resilience of a
WSN becomes in danger if an adversary gains access to the
master key in [1], or compromises only a single leaf sensor
node in CDA to acquire the common symmetric key shared
between all leaf nodes.
In [10], [15] public key encryption based on elliptic curves
is used to conceal transient data from leaf sensors to the BS.
These schemes enhance secrecy resilience of WSNs against
2individual sensor attacks, since compromising a single or a
set of sensor nodes won’t reveal the decryption key that only
the BS knows. An attracting feature of [10] is the introduc-
tion of data integrity in end-to-end encrypted WSNs through
Merkle hash trees of Message Authentication Codes (MACs).
However, both schemes raise power consumption concerns,
since computation requirements for public key encryption is
still considered high for WSNs [12].
Many hop-by-hop aggregation protocols in WSNs like [3],
[6], [9], [13], [17], provide more efficient aggregation opera-
tions and highly consider data integrity. However, since sensed
data being passed to non-leaf aggregators are revealed for
the sake of middle-way aggregation, hop-by-hop aggregation
protocols represent weaker model of data confidentiality per-
spective than end-to-end aggregation protocols. Data secrecy
can be revoked of a partition if a passive adversary has
obtained the key of the root aggregator of that partition.
A. Problem Statement
The challenge is to find a general security protocol for
aggregated WSNs that is not limited to certain topology
and provides strong data confidentiality comparable to those
in secure end-to-end communication protocols. Also, it can
provide efficient data aggregation and integrity comparable
to those in hop-by-hop aggregation, taking into account the
presence of active and passive adversaries. So, when some
nodes of the aggregated WSN are physically compromised,
compromiser must not gain more information or have influence
on aggregated results beyond the effects of its compromised
nodes. For these purposes, we propose our security protocol
that provides end-to-end data concealment using data diffu-
sion, and in the same time, it provides secure and flexible hop-
by-hop aggregation with efficient data integrity test followed
by attestation process when forged data are detected in order
to eliminate and exclude contributions of any compromised
nodes that might be the source of the forged data.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Notations
We use the following notations to describe our protocol:
• BS refers to the Base Station.
• S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} represents the set of sen-
sor/aggregator nodes in the WSN. Since in our model
sensors have the aggregation capabilities, the term sensor
will be used to refer to a sensor that aggregates as well.
• IDSi refers to the node ID of sensor node Si.
• KSi,Sj denotes a pairwise symmetric key between node
Si and node Sj . KSi and K
′
Si
are two pairwise symmetric
keys of node Si shared with the BS, and K is a set of all
keys.
• mSi denotes a sensed data read by sensor Si. mSi is a
bounded real value, i.e. mSi ∈ D = [u, v] for maximum
and minimum sensible values v and u, respectively.
• EncK(m) denotes an encryption of a message m using
a key K .
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Fig. 1. Network Model (Aggregated WSN).
• MAC(KSi ,mSi) denotes a message authentication code
of mSi that is sensed by sensor Si, this code is generated
using the symmetric key KSi that is shared between Si
and the BS.
• FK(m) refers to a diffusion algorithm that is a public
knowledge in the WSN. It takes as input a key K and a
data m, the result is a diffused value D ∈ [u, v].
• Si −→ Sj represents a one (or more) hop communication
from sensor node Si to Sj .
B. Network Model
We assume a general aggregated multi-hop WSN consisting
of a large collection of resource-constrained sensor/aggregator
nodes (MICA motes [5] for example) connected in a tree
topology rooted at a powerful node called the Base Station
(BS). An illustration of this model is depicted in Fig. 1. We
don’t impose any restrictions on the topology as long as it
is a connected tree rooted at the BS. We don’t require a
specific aggregation tree construction algorithm, any efficient
tree construction algorithm like TaG [8] can be used in our
model. The BS may initially issue aggregation queries or it
may be connected to an off-network distant querier which is in
this case considered data consumer, and the BS is considered
its query server. Aggregation queries represents the union of
all sensor readings along the paths of the WSN to its root, i.e.
the BS.
We assume that every sensor node Si is deployed with two
unique symmetric keys KSi and K
′
Si
shared with the BS, using
a secure key deployment protocol, like MIB [11]. A secure
broadcast authentication protocol is assumed for authenticating
messages, an example of such protocol is µTESLA [12]. Se-
cure key distribution between adjacent nodes is also assumed,
some can be found in [2].
C. Attacker Model
We assume a dual operational mode adversary (both passive
and active) who is interested in revealing in-network data
3secrecy and injecting forged data. In our model, we consider
effective attacks, where an adversary physically compromises
k ≪ n nodes to gain the advantage that would result of
attacking m nodes where k < m ≤ n without the need
of attempting such attack on these m nodes directly. That
is, with few compromised nodes, an adversary can endanger
the security of an aggregated WSN as if it had physically
compromised much larger collection of nodes. When we
denote a node as being physically compromised, we mean that
an adversary gained control over the node’s operation, having
access to all its memory, keys, and resources, and is capable
to reprogram such a compromised node with attacking code.
Attacker is not limited to a single place, it can compromise
scattered partitions of nodes in which every partition may have
nodes in parent/children relationship.
In this work, we don’t consider preventing attacks that
disrupt the regular operation of a WSN such as denial-
of-service (DoS) attack [14] or underlying routing protocol
attacks. We are interested in preventing attacks that aim to
acquire aggregation results or tamper them rather than attacks
that aim to prevent a querier from being served.
D. Design Goals
We designed our protocol to protect against spy-out and
false data injection attacks, for that, we considered the fol-
lowing security perspectives:
• Resilience: An adversary who compromises few nodes of
an aggregated WSN must not spy-out or gain any impact
on the final aggregation outcome beyond the influence of
the readings and results of its compromised nodes.
• Efficient Data Integrity, Commitment and Attestation:
Aggregation result must be verified to be the authentic
union of sensor readings and intermediate results. Such
verification and attestation processes should not impose
significant overhead over the WSN that is over aggrega-
tion communication overhead.
• Generality: The protocol should apply to any aggregated
WSN with arbitrary tree topology, moreover, the proto-
col should support expandable WSNs without any extra
reconfiguration.
• Status Monitoring: BS must determine when a sensor
node becomes dead or unreachable, by knowing and
maintaining a list of all nodes contributed in every
aggregation query.
IV. EFFICIENT AND SECURE DATA AGGREGATION
PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our proposed protocol that
resolves the compromise between data secrecy and efficient
aggregation. An overview of the protocol will be presented
first, then it will be followed by discussing the protocol details.
A. Overview
Our protocol is designed over the approach of data diffusion
that preserves the mathematical relationships between different
values which are all bounded by a defined range. By preserving
mathematical relationships we can perform efficient hop-by-
hop aggregation of collected diffused data. The information
of these mathematical relationships are kept concealed end-to-
end to maintain complete communication path secrecy. Beside
maintaining the mathematical relationships, the diffusion algo-
rithm must not increase the size of encrypted data. Based on
this, we can achieve efficient secure hop-by-hop aggregation
of end-to-end concealed data in aggregated WSNs.
B. Network Setup and Query Dissemination
After field deployment, communication paths should be
established. An efficient algorithm like TaG [8] can be used
for tree topology construction. Communication channels are
secured using pairwise encryption keys between every par-
ent/children nodes, this is the same technique used in many
hop-by-hop protocols (e.g. [17]) for securing communication
channels.
After tree construction, every sensor node Si sends its IDSi
and an initial random reading m0i ∈ [u, v] to the BS in a
message encrypted using pairwise symmetric key KSi . The
initial random reading m0i serves in data diffusion algorithm
as we will see later.
When the BS receives a query from a querier, it disseminates
this query through the WSN paths. This query contains the
desired aggregation function to be performed.
C. Data Diffusion
The purpose of the data diffusion process is to consolidate
transient data from intermediate aggregators while giving them
flexibility and efficiency while applying aggregation functions
on these concealed data. Data diffusion serves also in data
integrity check as we will see later. Every sensor node diffuses
its sensed data before transmission. Middle-way aggregation
of diffused data occurs before the final result reaches the BS,
which is the only one who can revert diffused result to its
actual value.
Assume S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} be the set of sensor nodes
and every node Si reads a value mSi . Every sensor node Si
uses a diffusion function FK(mSi), using the keys KSi and
K ′Si to generate a pair of diffused data, where KSi,K
′
Si
are
two shared keys between Si and the base station (BS). We
define the diffusion function FKSi (mSi) as follows:
Definition 1: Assume PS : D × K → D be a public
generator map (i.e., one way function) to produce
Dj = PS(KSi, Dj−1) (1)
where Dj ∈ D, D0 = m0Si , and KSi ∈ K for j ≥ 1 and
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let F : D × D −→ D be a diffusion function
defined as
FKSi (m
j
Si
) = PS(KSi, Dj−1)⊙m
j
Si
, (2)
The value of the generator sequence PS is taken as an
input along with the sensed reading mjSi to the mathematical
operand ⊙ which generates a diffused value FKSi (m
j
Si
) ∈ D.
There is no strict definition of operand ⊙, it refers to any
reversible operation that takes two inputs and produces an
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output that belongs to D. Examples of ⊙ could vary between
trivial operators such as simple addition ”+” to more complex
bijection functions. D′j is generated symmetrically to Dj , but
using key K ′Si instead of KSi .
Since the BS shares the private key KSi and initial random
reading m0Si of every sensor node Si, the BS is able to
generate the diffusion value Dj of every transmission phase.
This means that the BS can revert every diffused reading DjSi
sent by a sensor Si in the WSN to its actual value.
V. THE SUM AGGREGATION
In this section, we propose the SUM aggregation func-
tion in our secure aggregation protocol. The algorithm that
performs the SUM aggregation SumAgg is illustrated in
algorithm 1. When the BS receives a query of SUM aggre-
gation function, it broadcasts this request through the WSN.
Whenever a sensor node gets this request, it passes such a
request to its children nodes, this goes on until reaching leaf
level. A leaf sensor node receiving this request will send its
diffused reading to its parent. For illustration purposes, let
us consider the network in Fig. 2. Leaf sensor X sends the
following packet to its immediate parent W :
X −→W : IDX , IVX,W , EncKX,W
(
FKX (mX),
FK′
X
(mX)
)
,MACX (3)
where
MACX = MAC
(
KX , FKX (mX)||FK′
X
(mX)
)
(4)
As we can see, node X sends its IDX and an encrypted pair
of its diffused sensed data mX to its parent W . X also sends
a pairwise counter IVX,W to protect against replay attacks.
Finally, X sends a MAC of its reading using its private key and
attach it at the end of the packet for authentication purposes
as we shall see later.
The sensor node W receives similar packets from its other
children, i.e. Y and Z . Now W needs to aggregate data
received from its children along with its own sensed data mW .
This is done through applying the SUM aggregation function
Input: A WSN with set S of n nodes and BS.
Output: SUM aggregation result.
BS broadcasts SUM aggregation query in the WSN
for ∀Si ∈ S do
listSi = {IDSi}
Sense mSi
DSUMSi = FKSi (mSi)
DSUM
′
Si
= F
K
′
Si
(mSi)
for ∀Sj that is an immediate child of Si do
DSUMSi = DSUMSi +DSUMSj
DSUM
′
Si
= DSUM
′
Si
+DSUM
′
Sj
listSi = listSi ∪ listSj
end for
end for
BS sums aggregation of its immediate children nodes.
if IPET check for final aggregation result in the BS passes
then
return SUM
else
Call ComAtt /*Commitment and Attestation Algo.*/
end if
Algorithm 1: SumAgg: SUM Aggregation Algorithm
as we can see in the following packet that W sends to its
parent G:
W −→ G : listW , IVW,G, EncKW,G
( ∑
Si∈listW
FKSi (mSi),
∑
Si∈listW
F
K
′
Si
(mSi)
)
,MACW (5)
where
MACW =MAC
(
KW ,
∑
Si∈listW
FKSi (mSi)||
∑
Si∈listW
FK′
Si
(mSi)
)
⊕MACX ⊕MACY ⊕MACZ (6)
Here listW represents the list of all IDs of the children of
W who contributed in the aggregation, including IDW . As
we can see, W sends its IDW and IDs of all its children
who contributed in the aggregation, and the aggregated SUM
of their data. As shown above, W sums all pairs of data
in order, i.e. all first elements of every pair are summed
together, the same thing happens to second elements of all
pairs. This scenario continues until the BS receives from every
immediate child a packet that contains the IDs of all nodes
participated in the SUM aggregation on the partition rooted
by that child, along with its diffused aggregation pair. The BS
then computes the final aggregation pair (DSUM,DSUM ′)
of diffused summation:
(DSUM,DSUM
′
)=
( ∑
i∈list∗
FKi(mSi),
∑
i∈list∗
FK′
i
(mSi)
)
(7)
where
list∗ = listH ∪ . . . ∪ listG ∪ . . . ∪ listQ (8)
5The actual values of this diffused pair (DSUM,DSUM ′)
should refer to the same output, but since they are diffused
differently, they look different. Because the BS knows KSi
and K ′Si for every node Si, the BS is able to generate the
diffusion values that every node contributed in the aggre-
gation has used to diffuse its reading, the BS can revert
the pair (DSUM,DSUM ′) to their actual values. This is
done by finding the summations of all diffusion values that
were applied along the path of aggregation, and using these
summations when applying the reverse diffusion function on
counter parts results DSUM and DSUM ′ :
(SUM,SUM
′
) =
(
DSUM⊙¯
∑
i∈list∗
Di,
DSUM
′
⊙¯
∑
i∈list∗
D
′
i
)
(9)
Here, the operand ⊙¯ refers to the reverse of the diffusion
operation. Now the BS revealed the actual result of SUM
and SUM ′ aggregation, it needs to check the integrity of this
result. The BS checks the equality of reverted pair SUM and
SUM
′
, if they are equal then the aggregation result is accepted
(unless the BS doubts it), otherwise the result is rejected and
attestation process will start to detect the path and the source
of the outliers as explained in Section VI.
The test that uses equation 9 then checks the equality of
resulted pair is called Identical Pair Equality Test (IPET). IPET
is an O(1) heuristic that gives us a quick initial indication
about the integrity of the aggregation result.
Lemma 2: The complexity of SumAgg algorithm with data
diffusion is O(n ln(n)) on average, and the BS needs O(1) to
verify the integrity of the final aggregation result.
Other aggregation functions like MEAN and MAX can be
derived from above description of SUM aggregation with
slight modifications.
VI. COMMITMENT AND ATTESTATION
In this section we turn our attention to verifying sensor’s
commitments of aggregation, and attestation for finding outlier
or compromised nodes. Note that we don’t consider detecting
the case where a compromised node tries to forge its own
data, this is because such a situation is hard to detect if
forged data belongs to normal data range and this resembles
node malfunction. In contrast, we are interested in detecting
compromised nodes that are trying to forge aggregation data
of their non-compromised children. The divide and conquer
algorithm for commitment and attestation ComAtt is presented
in algorithm 2, this algorithm uses IPET check as a heuristic
to reconstruct only those branches of the network MAC
tree which are necessary for the attestation process, avoiding
unnecessary reconstruction of the whole MAC tree of the
WSN. When the BS discovers that the final aggregation result
fails the IPET check, it starts the attestation process by adding
its immediate children who contributed in the aggregation to
the set Q -which is the set containing nodes to be tested-
for verification. For every node Si ∈ Q, the BS checks Si
as follows. The BS asks from every node Si ∈ Q to resend
Input: list∗ (list of IDs of all nodes contributed in an
aggregation), MACAgg (MAC of final
aggregation result)
Output: listL (list of IDs of outliers)
listL = ∅, listC = ∅
Q = {Si : ∀Si ∈ list∗ ∧ Si is immediate children of BS}
while Q 6= ∅ do
Pick a node Si from Q
Si −→ BS : listSi , IVSi , (DSUMSi , DSUM
′
Si
),MACSi
MACCalcSi = Reconstructed MACSi in BS using collected
data and MACAgg
if MACCalcSi 6= MACSi OR IPET check of Si packet fails
then
if Si is not committed to its previous aggregation packet
then
listC = listC ∪ Si
end if
listL = listL ∪ Si
Q = Q ∪ {Sj : ∀Sj ∈ list∗ ∧ Sj is immediate children of
Si }
end if
Q = Q− Si
end while
for ∀Si ∈ listL − listC do
list
′
Si
= (listSi − listL) ∪ Si
Si −→ BS :
list
′
Si
, IVSi ,
(
∑
j∈list
′
Si
FKj (mj),
∑
j∈list
′
Si
F
K
′
j
(mj)),MACSi
if IPET check of aggregation pair of Si passes then
listL = listL − Si
end if
end for
RETURN listL
Algorithm 2: ComAtt: Commitment and Attestation Algo.
its aggregation packet. The BS then checks the commitment
of Si by constructing its authentication code MACCalcSi with
the help of the final aggregation result authentication code
MACAgg and collected data. If MACCalcSi is identical to
MACSi , then the BS knows that Si is committed to its
previously sent aggregation packet. If Si is committed and
its aggregation pair passes the IPET check then it is assumed
honest -unless the BS doubts its result as we shall see later-
and its descendants will be excluded from further verifications.
On the other hand, if Si appeared not to be committed to
its previously sent aggregation, or its aggregation pair fails
the IPET test, then Si is added to the list of outliers listL,
and every children Sj of Si is added to the set Q for further
investigation. For the case when commitment test of Si fails,
Si is also added to the list of not committed nodes listC .
After processing all nodes in Q, listL will be having
suspected nodes that either not committed or failed the IPET
check. Non-committed nodes in listL are directly considered
dishonest or compromised without any further investigation.
However, it might be the case that an honest committed node
in listL failed the IPET check because one or more of its
children were compromised. We need to eliminate such honest
nodes from listL, this is done by further investigation of
committed nodes that fail IPET check, i.e. Si ∈ listL− listC .
6For every such node Si, the BS requests a new aggregation
of Si that excludes data from any node Sj ∈ listL, that
is, the BS is giving Si a chance to prove its honesty by
finding the aggregation of its only honest children. If the new
aggregation of Si passes the IPET check, then Si is removed
from listL, otherwise, it is kept there. Finally, the ComAtt
algorithm returns listL that contains the set of outliers or
compromised nodes.
Lemma 3: The commitment process in ComAtt algorithm
is O(c lnn) in average for some constant c, and O(n) in the
worst case.
Proof: The proof is a direct consequence from the bi-
nary tree search algorithm, considering the height (depth) of
aggregation equals lnn in average
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show how our security protocol could be
compared to hop-by-hop and end-to-end protocols in terms of
security level and efficiency of data integrity check.
A. Node Attacks
We consider the logical hypothesis that a node Si is attacked
by an intruder (attacker) I . This attacker I can gain access to
all information of this node including KSi , listSi and mSi . In
this case, it can alter the message mSi to mI and encrypt it
using the key KSi . We show that the only influence such an
attacker can have on final aggregation result is sending forged
aggregation of attacked nodes. If the attacker attempts to
change the aggregation values of its children without knowing
their dual diffusion seeds, then this attempt will be quickly
caught by the IPET test. So, an attacker in this case won’t
be able to forge its aggregation except by changing its own
reading mI and aggregations of its children which their dual
diffusion seeds are known to the attacker. That is, if an attacker
wants to forge the aggregation of n nodes and not get caught
by IPET, then this attacker must compromise or acquire private
data of n nodes.
Lemma 4: Our aggregation protocol represents a security
model against spy-out attacks that is better or at least as good
as hop-by-hop aggregation protocols.
Proof: Our protocol has an advantage over hop-by-hop
protocols because of transient data diffusion. Only when a
passive adversary succeeds in breaking the diffused data of all
children of a hop, our protocol becomes vulnerable to spy-out
attacks as any other hop-by-hop protocol.
Lemma 5: Our protocol performs either more efficient or at
least as good as end-to-end aggregation protocols in checking
data integrity.
Proof: In our protocol, we use IPET heuristic to recon-
struct the only necessary branches of the MAC tree for testing
data integrity. In the worst case, we will need to reconstruct the
whole MAC tree, which is the case in end-to-end protocols.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we demonstrated a model for secure data
aggregation in WSNs, which is a blend of hop-by-hop opera-
tional efficiency and end-to-end data secrecy. We showed that
this model has low computational complexity and the BS uses
O(1) heuristic to verify final aggregation result of sensed data
and it needs O(lnn) in average to detect an attacked node.
We plan to perform simulation and further security analysis
of this model in our future work.
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